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Introduction

The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that malaria, a parasitic
disease transmitted by mosquitoes, causes over 300 million episodes of “acute
illness” and more than one million deaths annually. 1 Most of the deaths occur in
poor countries of the tropics, and about 90 percent occur in sub-Saharan Africa.
Infants and children account for most of the mortality from malaria; the disease is
thought to account for one of every five child deaths in the world. 2
Even where people survive malaria, the disease causes numerous health and
cognitive problems. It is associated with maternal anemia during pregnancy, with
low birth weight for babies, and it is a major cause of childhood anemia. Severe
disease episodes (i.e., “cerebral” malaria) have been shown to cause severe longterm physical and neurological disability. There is no clear evidence on the
cognitive impact of malaria on individuals who contract less severe cases of the
disease, although there are reasons to suspect non-trivial effects on learning
among schoolchildren. 3
There is no effective vaccine or inoculation to prevent malaria. However, the
disease can be treated at relatively low cost (at least in its milder forms) with
drugs or even simple measures to reduce the severity of symptoms. Prevention
measures are also relatively inexpensive. For example, mosquito nets impregnated
with insecticides, available for $5-$10 each (or less), can significantly reduce
exposure to mosquitoes and thereby limit malaria morbidity and mortality. 4 But
these measures may require careful implementation and recurring maintenance,
which may not be feasible for many affected families.
At present, many of the world’s poor countries face high rates of malaria
endemism. By one estimate, about 40 percent of the world’s population lives in
areas where malaria is endemic, and these people are on average very poor.
According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “Malaria is truly a
disease of poverty. It afflicts primarily the poor, who tend to live in malaria-prone
areas in dwellings that offer few, if any, barriers against mosquitoes” (UNICEF
2005). Sachs and Malaney (2002) argue that “[a]s a general rule of thumb, where
malaria prospers most, human societies have prospered least…. The extent of the
correlation suggests that malaria and poverty are intimately related.”
1

Reported by WHO on the “Roll Back Malaria” program website at:
http://mosquito.who.int/cmc_upload/0/000/015/372/RBMInfosheet_1.htm, January 30, 2005.
2
Reported by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
http://www.unicef.org/health/index_malaria.html, accessed June 10, 2005.
3
A useful survey is Holding and Snow (2001).
4
UNICEF reports that the use of such bednets can reduce child mortality from malaria by 20
percent (http://www.unicef.org/health/index_malaria.html, accessed June 10, 2005).
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The causality of this relationship is complicated, however. Does malaria cause
poverty? Or does poverty cause malaria? Both channels of causation seem
reasonable. It is also possible, as noted by Sachs and Malaney (2002), that the
correlation could be spurious, caused perhaps by some other direct connection
between climate and geography with growth rates or income levels. Resolving
these causality issues has been difficult for researchers trying to assess the
economic impact of malaria.
In spite of the difficulties involved, two widely publicized papers have found
that malaria appears to slow economic growth in poor countries. Both papers use
cross-country regression techniques and attempt to use instruments or controls to
address the obvious causality problems. McCarthy, Wolf, and Wu (1999) find that
malaria prevalence is negatively related to growth of per capita income. In turn,
they find that malaria morbidity is linked to climatic differences across countries.
The magnitude of malaria’s effect on growth is substantial: they find that SubSaharan African countries experience a reduction in income growth of 0.55
percent annually because of malaria. Using a relatively similar methodology,
Gallup and Sachs (2000) find that countries with “intensive” malaria experience a
reduction in per capita income growth of 1.3% annually. They suggest that,
everything else being equal, a country experiencing intensive malaria would have
its long-term level of income per capita reduced by one-third, compared with the
same country in the absence of malaria. 5
Based on this analysis, Sachs and other authors have suggested increasing
current spending on malaria control by more than an order of magnitude. Global
spending on malaria prevention and control is currently around $100-200 million
annually. 6 But based in large part on his estimates of the economic impacts of the
disease, Sachs (2005b) has estimated that $2-3 billion in annual spending would
be needed to control the disease effectively in Africa alone. These larger sums are
clearly within the capacity of the international community, but they would
represent a substantial fraction of total aid disbursements by rich countries. 7 As a
result, the increases would either require significant reallocation of existing aid
portfolios or increases in the total quantities of foreign assistance given by rich
countries.
To the extent that such increases in expenditure are justified by appealing to
the likely impact on income levels and growth rates in malarial countries, it is
useful to look further at the evidence for malaria’s impact on income levels.
5

These numbers passed from academic research into policy; in the Abuja Declaration of 2000 40
African heads of state and governments signed on to a major commitment to fight malaria, citing
these numbers as one major justification.
6
Sachs and Malaney (2002) use the lower estimate.
7
In 2002, OECD countries gave $58.3 billion in foreign assistance of all kinds.
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In the empirical literature, Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) offer a far more
skeptical view of the growth effects of disease, based on an instrumental variables
approach. They are joined in this skepticism by Weil (2006) and Cutler, Fung,
Kremer and Singhal (2007). Some other authors (Bleakley 2007, Lucas 2005),
however, find evidence that malaria eradication campaigns resulted – after very
long time lags – in quantitatively significant impacts on health, fertility, and
income. Some difficulties with the empirical literature include the paucity of
reliable data and the inherent difficulty of identification.
To provide a different perspective on the issue, we find it useful to present a
formal model of malaria in a dynamic setting. Our paper is somewhat related to
work by Chakraborty, Papageorgiou, and Pérez Sebastiàn (2007) that looks at an
overlapping generation economy with malaria. 8 But because their analysis is
based on a two-period model, quantitative results on the magnitude of disease
impacts are hard to interpret.
Our paper brings an explicit dynamic general equilibrium framework to the
question of malaria’s impacts. We incorporate an epidemiological model of
disease (following Gersovitz and Hammer 2004, 2005 or Philipson 2000), with a
standard general equilibrium framework. Using a calibrated version of the model,
we examine the impact of malaria on steady-state economic outcomes in the
absence of prevention and control measures. We also model the impact of costly
prevention measures, including measures that are less than fully effective.
2.

Background

Malaria is an ancient disease, although its exact origins and evolutionary
history are unclear. It was described in China some five thousand years ago. It is
thought to have originated in Africa and to have spread subsequently into Asia
and the Mediterranean. Greek writers recognized the disease and its symptoms,
and one source notes that malaria was responsible for the decline of city-state
populations and depopulation of rural areas. 9 The disease appears to have
migrated to the New World following the Columbian exchange, and to this day,
fewer different strains of malaria are found in the Americas than in Africa and
Asia. Recent research suggests that the origins and spread of the disease in the
Old World paralleled the spread of sedentary agriculture (Tishkoff et al., 2001). 10

8

An earlier version of this paper is circulated as Papageorgiou, Chakraborty, and Pérez Sebastiàn
(2005); this covers similar ground using a closely related model, but with an endowment economy
that offers little insight into the interaction between income and disease.
9
See http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/history (cited June 2005).
10
See also McNeill (1976), pp. 219-221.
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Historically, malaria was endemic in most regions of the world. The morbidity
and mortality burden of malaria differ from country to country, in part because the
prevalence of the disease (and the conditions that give rise to the disease) differ
substantially across regions. Hamoudi and Sachs (1999) report that historically,
malaria was found as far north as 64° N latitude (farther north than Stockholm or
Moscow) and as far south as 32° S.

2.1

Disease biology and ecology

Malaria is a disease caused by a family of macroparasites that infect humans.
There are in fact four species of Plasmodium parasites that cause malaria in
people. These four species have similar life cycles; all are transmitted to humans
by a mosquito vector (various species of Anopheles mosquitoes) and live a portion
of their life cycle in the mosquito host.
A person is infected with malaria when he or she is bitten by an infected
mosquito, which passes the Plasmodium parasite into the person’s bloodstream in
a form known as a sporozoite. The parasites lead a complex life cycle inside the
human host, living at various stages in liver cells and red blood cells. From time
to time, they cycle through stages in which they destroy numerous red blood cells.
It is at this stage that the disease generates its most severe symptoms in infected
people. Eventually, the parasites become gametocytes which are in turn ingested
by mosquitoes that bite the human host. Inside the mosquito, the gametocytes
mature, reproduce sexually, and migrate into the mosquito’s salivary glands, at
which stage the life cycle is repeated. 11 For some species of Plasmodium, the
parasites may persist in the liver for months or years, resulting in chronic and
recurring eruptions of merozoites that correspond to episodes of fever and
sickness.
The disease varies with the infecting species of Plasmodium and with the
individual’s prior health and immune status. Typically, it causes fever and chills,
along with headaches, vomiting, and diarrhea. It may also cause long-term
anemia, liver damage, and neurological damage. The most dangerous species, P.
falciparum, can cause cerebral malaria, a frequently fatal condition involving the
brain and central nervous system. Those who survive cerebral malaria may
experience lasting brain damage.
The prevalence of the disease varies across the globe, largely due to
differences in the human exposure to Anopheles mosquito bites. Some of this
variation is geographic and climatic: these mosquitoes are not found in areas of
11

The life cycle is described and illustrated at: http://www.dpd.cdc.gov/dpdx/HTML/Malaria.htm
(viewed June 2005).
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intense cold or in deserts (Sachs and Malaney 2002). Human exposures are also
reduced in areas where mosquitoes spend winter months as eggs or in dormant
stages of their life cycle. Exposures may also be reduced in areas where people
spend significant fractions of their time indoors in enclosed or screened buildings,
or where people are dressed in ways that will reduce exposure.
The ecological adaptation of different mosquito species is also important.
Although many species of Anopheles mosquitoes are capable of transmitting the
Plasmodium organisms, transmission occurs only when a mosquito first bites an
infected human and then subsequently bites another (uninfected) human. Some
species of mosquitoes, however, prefer not to feed on humans (although they will
do so if other food sources are not available). Others are anthropophilic; i.e., they
prefer to feed on humans. Anthropophilic mosquitoes are obviously more likely to
transmit malaria from individual to individual. Thus, areas where anthropophilic
mosquitoes are prevalent are likely to face more acute malaria burdens.
McNeill (1976) notes that the geographic distribution of mosquito species is
largely due to chance, from the perspective of humans. The distribution depends
on highly local ecological differences (trace minerals in the water, salinity of
water, types of habitat, etc.). Thus, pure ecological chance had large effects on the
relative prevalence of different mosquito species, across the globe, and hence on
the relative prevalence of malaria. McNeill notes that “the mosquito species
which is Europe’s most efficient vector of malaria… prefers to feed on cattle. If
enough alternate sources of blood are available to them, these mosquitoes will
eschew potential human hosts and thus interrupt the chain of infection, since
cattle do not suffer from malaria” (p. 117).
In fact, one of the apparent reasons for the extensive malaria burden in subSaharan Africa is the prevalence of two species of highly anthropophilic species
of Anopheles mosquitoes: An. gambiae and An. funestus. These two species
together inhabit much of the humid zone of Africa, and only the northern and
southern extremities of the continent are free from these strongly anthropophilic
species. 12 This clearly plays a significant role in accounting for malaria’s impact
in the region, although poverty may also play an important part (Sachs and
Malaney 2002).
It is true that the types of mosquito prevalent in different regions are, in an
ecological sense, related to human impacts on the landscape. It is also true,
however, that the distribution of mosquito species across the landscape is largely
exogenous in the short run. For the purposes of this paper, we will treat mosquito
habitats as an exogenous characteristic of a place.
The distribution of Anopheles species around the globe is shown at:
http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/biology/mosquito/map.htm.
12
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Economic impact of malaria

As noted above, malaria causes morbidity and mortality with obvious
economic consequences. Sachs and Malaney (2002) survey a number of the
impacts of malaria. The direct individual economic impacts of the disease include
the value of lives lost, the value of time lost to sickness, and the expenditures on
medical care, treatment, and prevention. Direct social costs include government
expenditures on malaria control and prevention. The indirect costs may be greater
still. These include changes in human settlement and labor patterns induced by the
disease (e.g., changes in the locations where people live or farm). Indirect costs
also include the consequences of the disease on fertility, demography, and human
capital investments; on trade patterns and investment; and potentially on
managerial quality and technology adoption. (For example, skilled managers may
prefer not to work in malarial regions, resulting in reduced productivity levels.) 13
Impacts of malaria on fertility and human capital decisions are difficult to
document, since all are related to income levels. The same is true of malaria’s
impacts on trade and investment and many other variables that are correlated with
income levels.
3.

The Base Model

To consider the impact of malaria on income levels, we need a model
environment in which both channels of causation are present: in other words,
malaria can affect income and/or productivity, and simultaneously, income and/or
productivity can affect the prevalence of the disease. We also need to use a model
in which it is possible to consider the behavioral responses that individuals may
take to reduce the short-term and dynamic impact of the disease. Finally, we need
a model in which it is possible to consider alternative policies for controlling
malaria.
We present here the simplest possible model that has all the necessary features
for addressing the link between income and disease prevalence. It tracks the
dynamics of the spread of malaria, has endogenous production and prices, factors
13

At an even more remote level, it might be possible to view human biological adaptations to
malaria as part of the indirect cost. Thus, sickle cell traits, found in some individuals of African
descent, are damaging and costly in their own right. Medical literature strongly suggests that the
sickle cell trait confers some resistance to malaria and is thus an adaptive evolutionary response to
the disease. Arguably, then, we could count the costs of sickle cell anemia as one of the indirect
costs of malaria.
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in idiosyncratic shocks – both from malaria and other sources – and takes into
account the differential mortality for sick and disease-free people. There are no
insurance markets, but households can accumulate assets to self-insure against
persistent idiosyncratic shocks. Essentially, this is a Huggett (1996) economy with
epidemiological features embedded. The epidemiological aspects of the model are
similar to those presented by Philipson (2000), and we borrow from his analysis
of “rational epidemics.”

3.1

Model environment

The model environment has many individuals, born identical. New individuals
are born each period. Some individuals die in each period, with mortality rates
dependent on infection rates. Individuals are exposed to the disease in each
period; some fall sick. The probability that an individual will become sick is
positively related to the fraction of individuals in the population who are already
sick, so infection rates are endogenous to the model. Sick individuals face
heightened probabilities of death and lower labor productivity. To avoid
population explosions or collapses, we model fertility rates as consistent with a
constant population level.
Individuals are born healthy. They have zero initial asset holdings, but they
accumulate assets through their lives. Assets can be rented to a representative firm
in a perfectly competitive market for current-period production. However, there is
no credit market, nor is there any insurance market. Therefore, individuals in the
economy will use precautionary savings to protect themselves from idiosyncratic
shocks. Assets vanish when people die. 14
Note that some characteristics of this asset make it similar to human capital:
people are born with no positive endowment; they cannot hold negative amounts;
and their holdings disappear upon death. It is also the only savings technology in
a rudimentary economy. In other respects, however, the asset is perhaps more like
physical capital: it is measured in the same units as output and consumption, and
thus it can be used to smooth consumption or to make “lumpy’ purchases. In these
respects, the asset is more analogous to physical capital than to human capital.
As in Philipson (2000), individuals may, at any point during their lives, make
a lumpy purchase of a preventive good that will confer future protection from
malaria. This lifetime prophylaxis requires a one-time expenditure of q units of
consumption good. We think of this as the present value of a lifetime expenditure
14

This assumption effectively serves as a type of depreciation in the economy. We could equally
well allow for assets to be redistributed to the new generation. The qualitative results of the model
would not change significantly.
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stream on bednets, drugs, and other preventive goods. Alternatively, if an
effective vaccine were to become available for malaria, we could model this as
the cost of the vaccine. Note that this is an indivisible purchase, and we initially
model it as being totally and perfectly effective. In other words, once an
individual has purchased the prophylaxis, he or she does not subsequently
contract malaria, and there is no need for future spending. Subsequently, we will
relax the assumption of perfect efficacy. In fact, our quantitative results, reported
below, show that that when the preventive goods offer imperfect protection, there
are large quantitative impacts on uptake, infection rates, and economic outcomes.
3.2

Preferences and endowments
Preferences for any household i are given by the period utility function:
u ( cit ; sit ) =
∞

with lifetime utility given by:

sit ⎡⎣γ ( cit − c ) ⎤⎦

1− ρ

1− ρ

∑ β u ( c ; s ) , where sit reflects a utility cost of
t =0

t

it

it

being sick, such that sit ∈ {s ,1} , 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 . A value of sit = 1 corresponds to health,
and a value of sit = s corresponds to sickness. The parameter γ is a scalar that will
determine the utility level of subsistence, and it will be calibrated below to give a
plausible value for the “value of life” for people in the model economy.
Given their health status, households care only about consumption. They also
face a subsistence consumption requirement, c . This may be important in
determining the affordability of disease prevention measures for different
households.
Individuals are endowed with one unit of labor time in each period, which
they supply inelastically to the labor market. Their effective labor units depend on
health status, sit , and π it , which is an indicator of labor efficiency. This efficiency
parameter is subject to idiosyncratic shocks and evolves according to a Markov
process. Healthy individuals supply one raw unit of labor; if they are sick,
however, their raw labor supply is reduced to h . Effective labor units are
determined by the raw labor supply and the idiosyncratic shock, so that:

⎧π h , if sit = s
hit = ⎨ it
⎩ π it , if sit = 1
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.
Individuals have the capacity to influence their health status through the
decision of whether or not to purchase prophylaxis against malaria. We define q
to be a basket of consumption goods necessary to achieve permanent disease
protection (described in more detail below), and pt is individual i’s decision to

purchase q. This choice is a binary choice, such that pit ∈ {0,1} .

Given this setup, the individual’s period budget constraint is given by:
cit + ki ,t +1 + pit q ≤ wt hitπ it + rt kit

where kit > 0 denotes accumulated assets, rt is the return to capital, and wt is the
wage.

3.3

Technology

The technology side of our model economy is characterized by an aggregate
technology with constant returns to scale. Individual effective labor units
aggregate to Lt = ∑ hitπ it , and individual asset holdings aggregate to the physical
i

capital stock K t = ∑ kit . These are used to produce output Yt according to the
i

Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = K tα L1t −α .
Factor prices then correspond to the marginal products of the factors. Thus, we
assume that there is a perfect rental market for factors in this economy, with only
spot markets available. Firms earn zero profits, and since there are no fixed costs,
we can treat the economy as having a single cost-minimizing aggregate firm
which rents capital and labor from the population and earns zero profits in
equilibrium.
3.4

Population dynamics

In such an environment, population dynamics become important. We need to
specify birth and mortality rates, which are differentiated across populations of
sick and healthy people. We also need to model the risk of infection. Let d h and
d s be the death rates of healthy and sick people, respectively. Let their fertility
rate be f .
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Defining N as the total population, we denote S as the proportion of sick
people:
∑i Si
⎧1,if si = s
S=
, where Si = ⎨
.
N
⎩0, otherwise
Trivially, the proportion of healthy people in the economy can be written as
H = 1 − S . Let V be the proportion of people who have purchased prophylaxis.
This is effectively a stock variable. In each period, there are also people
purchasing prophylaxis; this fraction is given by:
∑i pi
P=
.
N
This group can in turn be divided into those who purchase when healthy and
those who purchase when already sick. The healthy purchasers are given by:
pi
∑
i∈H
Ph =
,
H
while those purchasing q when already sick are given by:

Ps =

∑p
i∈S

S

i

.

Define the indicator variable vi such that it takes a value of unity for
individuals who have ever purchased protection and zero for all others. Then the
fraction of individuals who are protected from disease is given by:
∑i vi
V=
.
N
Note that these individuals may be sick or healthy at the time when they
∑i vi Si
∑i vi (1 − Si )
purchase protection. Thus, we have Vs =
and Vh =
. In
N
N
equilibrium, people who are sick will not choose to purchase protection, since it
will not cure them of the disease. (We could model this differently, without any
substantive change in the results.)
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Laws of motion

Armed with this notation, we can write the laws of motion for different groups
in the economy as follows:
For population, the net increment to population comes from deaths of sick and
healthy people and from the fertility of sick and healthy people. Note that we do
not treat men and women separately, nor do we model fertility rates as agedependent, so that all individuals in the model economy can bear children. Thus:
N ′ = N − d s S − d h H + fN .
The proportion S of sick people depends on births, deaths, and infection. Let I
be the infection rate for healthy people who have not purchased prophylaxis.
Then:

S′ =

N ⎡⎣ S − d s S + IH (1 − V )(1 − d h ) ⎤⎦
N − d s S − d h H + fN

The proportion of people who are protected from disease evolves according to
the law of motion
N ⎡V − d sVs − d hVh + Ph H (1 − d h ) + Ps S (1 − d s ) ⎤⎦
.
V′ = ⎣
N − d s S − d h H + fN
We need still to characterize the infection rate I that applies for healthy people
who have not purchased prophylaxis. Following Philipson (2000), we assume that
the probability of contracting an infection depends on the proportion of people
already infected and also on the inherent ecology of the disease. Thus, we make
use of a formulation in which the infection rate itself evolves according:
⎛S⎞
i=Z⎜ ⎟
⎝N⎠

μ

⎛S⎞
where ⎜ ⎟ is the fraction of the population that is currently sick, Z is an index of
⎝N⎠
malaria ecology, and μ is a parameter. This function has important properties. If
either the population is fully healthy or the malaria ecology is zero, the next
period’s infection rate will be zero: this is a steady state. It is also the case that if
both the infection rate and the ecology are at 1, this is another steady state. Note
that our treatment of infection differs slightly from that of Philipson, whose
“hazard rate” for infection combines both the natural rate of infection and the
behavioral response. We define i here to be the probability that an unprotected
individual will become infected in the next period; i.e., conditional on the
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individual not purchasing protection. Philipson’s hazard rate, by contrast, gives an
unconditional probability.
Finally, defining Ct = ∑ cit , and dropping time subscripts, the law of motion
i

for the aggregate capital stock is given by K ′ = K + Y − C − PqN − d s K s − d h K h ,
where K s and K h are respectively the aggregate capital held by the sick and the
healthy. Note that the distribution of capital across individuals is non-degenerate.
Indeed, good and bad luck with idiosyncratic shocks and health determine how
much an individual accumulates. There is no borrowing or lending, nor is there
insurance, so capital acts as a “rainy day fund” for individuals in the economy.
3.6

Equilibrium

We will define an equilibrium in this economy using a recursive approach. An
equilibrium will consist of functions of the state variables for the economy and for
the individuals:
•
•
•
•
•

Functions for prices and wages;
Functions for individual consumption, asset holdings, labor supply, and
disease protection decisions;
Distributions of health status and capital across individuals.
Functions for the aggregate labor and aggregate capital employed in
production, and the aggregate output produced;
Laws of motions for each type’s endogenous state

such that individuals of each type maximize utility subject to budget constraints,
across states; the representative firm maximizes profits, subject to zero profits;
factor markets and goods markets clear; the distributions of health status and
capital are invariant; and the individual functions are consistent with the
aggregate laws of motion for the economy.
Characterizing and solving for the equilibrium of this economy can be
complicated. Note that disease dynamics imply that this economy will display
multiple steady states. To see this, observe that with S = 0, there will be a steady
state regardless of how many people purchase prophylaxis. In general, the
existence of an interior steady state (0 < S <1) will depend on the cost of the
protective goods, q, relative to the subsistence consumption requirement and the
distribution of capital per person in the economy. With higher levels of capital,
the economy can jump from one in which prophylaxis is generally unprofitable to
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one in which it is universal. Some poor economies, however, will never escape
the high-disease trap. By contrast, other economies will start with sufficiently
high levels of capital per worker that they will defeat the malaria burden.
The steady states here differ a little from those of standard Solow models.
Like other models of this type, the steady state is determined as the point at which
asset accumulation (initial asset endowments of the newly born plus savings from
those who are alive) exactly offsets the loss of capital that occurs when
individuals die. Our models display multiple steady states, because of the disease
dynamics involved.
We view the multiplicity of steady states in the model as a substantively
useful one for thinking about why some countries have been able to leave behind
the problems of malaria, while other countries – even those with similar climate
and geography – remain caught in a trap characterized by low productivity and
high infection. For example, Singapore has effectively eliminated malaria
infection, whereas Congo – a country that is reported to have a comparable
malaria ecology – suffers from vastly higher rates of infection. Pakistan and Sri
Lanka have roughly comparable malaria ecologies (Sachs et al. 2004), and
income per capita in Sri Lanka is almost double the level in Pakistan (Heston et
al. 2002), but Sri Lanka has a reported malaria prevalence rate that is 20 times
that of Pakistan (Asian Development Bank 2005).
In our model, multiplicity allows for countries at similar income levels and
with similar malaria ecologies to have different equilibrium levels of malaria
prevalence, prevention, and other variables.
Finally, we note that the model economy – as is typical of models with
infectious disease – is characterized by an important externality related to the
transmission of disease. An individual contemplating the decision of whether or
not to purchase prevention does not take into account the potential impact of her
decision on the infection rates faced by others. As a result, private actors are
likely to purchase inefficiently low levels of the preventive good. Thus, there may
be a role for the government to subsidize the bundle of preventive goods.

4.

Calibration

We are interested in a set of quantitative experiments in which we assess the
effects on aggregate output of various (exogenous) changes that will affect both
malaria prevalence and economic variables of interest. The first such experiment
is to ask simply how large an effect malaria can have in an economy where no
protective measures are available; in other words, where there is no behavioral
response that is effective in reducing the burden of malaria. Arguably, this is a
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useful framework for thinking about the impact of the disease in some of the most
severely affected environments, where neither spraying nor chemoprophylaxis nor
drug treatments are effectively able to reduce the proportion of people suffering
from the disease.
Specifically, the experiment we conduct is to calibrate the model to a set of
benchmark parameters and then to suppose that the cost of a preventive bundle of
goods, represented by q, is prohibitive.
To carry out this and our subsequent experiments, we need to select values for
the parameters of the model. A number of the parameters we take from the
literature, and others we choose to match observations for a stylized poor malarial
country. For all the important parameters of the model, we perform robustness
checks, as described below.
The parameters for preferences we take to be standard. The discount factor β
we set to 0.95, assuming annual frequency, and we set the risk aversion parameter
ρ = 1. The disutility of sickness is measured by the parameter s , which we set
equal to 1.0 in the benchmark economy, implying no disutility. We also report
robustness checks using a value of 0.9, which is consistent with estimates of
“disability weights” such as those reported by Murray and Lopez (1996). The
change is not quantitatively important in our model.
Since malaria increases the probability of death in our model, we also need to
consider the value that people associate with living as opposed to dying. For this
we draw on estimates from the U.S. that estimate the statistical value of a life at
approximately $4 million to $9 million (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Taking $7
million as a reasonable middle number, we compute that this is approximately
11.3 times lifetime consumption in the U.S. As a result, we set the subjective
value placed on living at 11.3 times annual consumption in the benchmark
economy, which pins down a value of γ = 11.3. This number is also subjected to
some robustness checks, which are reported below.
We use a value of 0.9 for the labor efficiency units of a person infected with
malaria. This reflects a number of micro studies in the literature and is broadly
consistent with Bleakley’s work (2003) looking at malaria in the U.S. South. The
subsistence constraint is set to zero in the benchmark economy.
Individuals also face idiosyncratic shocks independent of the risk of
contracting malaria. We need to specify both the transition matrix for shocks and
the magnitude of the shocks. In the experiments reported here, the magnitude of
the shocks is taken to be 0.224 (following Domeij and Heathcote 2004), while the
transition matrix is set to:
⎡.900 .100 ⎤
⎢.100 .900 ⎥ .
⎣
⎦
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We use a capital share on the aggregate production technology of 0.36, in
keeping with standard practice in the literature.
This leaves fertility rates and death rates for healthy and sick people, plus the
crucial parameters relating to the cost of preventive goods and the infection rate.
Death rates are taken to be 0.075 for sick people (i.e., those infected with
malaria) and 0.015 for healthy people. It is difficult to know which observations
in the data to use for calibrating these parameters, but we believe the results to be
quite robust to the death rates. To simplify the analysis, we set the fertility rate
such that population will be stable in equilibrium. In other words, we allow the
fertility rate to adjust to offset the deaths of sick and healthy people.
The cost of prophylaxis is another critical parameter for the model. Chima et
al. (2003) provide a good summary of the literature on the costs of prevention and
treatment of malaria in Africa. These numbers are hard to interpret, because (a)
the figures given are often averages that include people who did not purchase
preventive goods; (b) the goods on which people are spending money are not in
fact effective in prevention (e.g., mosquito coils); and (c) the expenditure on
bednets, screens, and mosquito coils is only partly intended to reduce malaria
incidence, while also serving the purpose of reducing the annoyance of mosquito
bites. Nevertheless, some reasonable numbers come out: bednets cost between $5
and $10 per person and last perhaps five years under reasonable use. At an
interest rate of 0.05, the present value of a lifetime stream of bednet purchases at
$5 is about $20-$25 per person, which assuming per capita income of about $500
could be modeled as a one-time fixed cost of 4-5% of annual per capita income.
At $10 per bednet, obviously, the number rises to 8-10% of per capita income. (At
an interest rate of 0.10, this falls back to 5%.) The estimates of eventual
vaccination costs are not much different in NPV terms, with estimates of $20$60. 15 Thus, it seems that realistic values for this cost might range from 0.05 to
0.10 of annual income.
Finally, we have the parameters Z and μ for the infection rate process. Using
the malaria ecology index of Sachs et al. (2004), we re-scale to define the index
on the interval [0,1] and then find a value of 0.7 for a “typical” malarial country.
In the data, this corresponds roughly to the level prevalent in Cambodia,
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, or Congo. For that matter, it is also the malaria
ecology prevalent in Singapore, a country with essentially no malaria. Thus, the
malaria ecology value that we choose is consistent in the real world with both
malarial countries and malaria-free countries.

15

At present, of course, no effective vaccine is available.
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The parameter μ gives the elasticity of next period’s infection rate with
respect to the malaria ecology. We can estimate this by regressing infection rates
on malaria ecology. A value of 0.122 was obtained from this regression.

5.

Experiments and Results

Using the calibrated model, we conducted a number of experiments that we
report below. The first experiment considers an economy in which protection
from malaria is not possible. We compare its healthy and unhealthy steady states.
The second experiment considers the same question for an economy in which
malaria protection is available, though costly. We carry out this experiment for a
large range of possible costs. Finally, we repeat the second experiment for a range
of possible parameter values, to assess the robustness of our results.
Experiment 1:
The first experiment that we consider is one in which we compare the
benchmark economy in two steady states, one of which has everyone healthy and
the other of which has essentially all people sick. A simple way to arrive at these
steady states is to set the cost of the preventative good at a very high level, so that
it is effectively unavailable. The two steady states can be found by initializing the
economy with all sick people or all healthy people. Both steady states are feasible,
and initial conditions in the model economy will determine which one pertains.
An economy that begins poor and sick will tend to say poor and sick, while one
that starts with better health or higher initial assets will end up at a better steady
state.
The comparison of these two steady states offers an insight into the maximum
possible impact of the disease within the model economy. In effect, we are
examining the case in which there is no behavioral response to malaria. This
provides a kind of upper bound of the disease’s impact, within the model.
Table 1 shows the results of this experiment. The impact of the disease in this
case is large. The steady state with widespread malaria infection has an income
per capita that is 43 percent lower than that in the healthy steady state. Per capita
consumption is even lower, with a 49 percent reduction from the healthy steady
state. The proximate cause of the reduction is that steady state asset holdings are
only 25 percent of the value in the healthy steady state. This reflects the shorter
average lifespans of people in the malarial steady state: they do not live as long as
those in the healthy steady state, nor do they expect to live as long, and they are
poorer while alive. As a result, they save at a lower rate and accumulate assets
over a shorter period. Figure 1 shows the distributions of asset holdings for the
healthy steady state and the malarial steady state, and the impact of the disease is
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evident. It is this effect, rather than the direct impact of the disease on effective
labor units, that has the greatest impact.
One way to think about this experiment is to view it as the benefits to the
model economy of escaping from its malarial steady state and moving to its
healthy steady state. Are there substantial impacts on income, as Sachs seems to
suggest? Can we identify important ex post differences between the two
economies?
The answer here is that there is a large difference in steady-state incomes
between the two economies. The difference is not sufficient to explain why
malarial countries are poor and non-malarial countries are rich, but it is true that
in the model economy, eradication of malaria would lead approximately to a
doubling of per capita income. This is a large impact. Note that the macro impacts
of the response are far greater than the micro impacts; although individuals lose
only 10 percent of their labor productivity to the disease, the lower asset
accumulation leads to an amplification mechanism through which the disease
impacts are multiplied.
Experiment 2:
In the second experiment, we ask again about the impact of a single economy
moving between its “healthy” steady state and its “sick” steady state. In contrast
to the first experiment, however, we assume that an effective preventive good is
available, though costly. Table 2 reports the results for a cost of prevention
approximately equal to 25 percent of steady-state annual income; this would be
comparable to a one-time cost of prevention of around $90, in an economy in
which annual income is about $1 per day. 16
What is the quantitative impact of the disease when costly but effective
prevention measures are available? Table 2 shows the results of the experiment,
comparing outcomes across the low and high steady states for a model economy
in which q = 0.6. In this experiment, the economy in its low steady state has
essentially the entire population protected from malaria, even though the
protection is quite costly. People are willing to spend a large fraction of income to
avoid getting sick.
The disease is not entirely eradicated, however, and people cannot forego the
costs of protection. Indeed, as long as some malaria is present, there are
individuals who become infected as newborns before they are able to buy
prophylaxis. Clearly this is rare, but it does imply that the steady state of this
economy gives slightly lower welfare one in which the disease is actually
16

This is not far from the expected lifetime costs of a vaccine that has to be readministered at fiveyear intervals, or from the total expected lifetime cost of insecticide-treated bednets, as calculated
by Johnson (2007).

17.

Gollin and Zimmermann

Malaria

8/12/2007

eradicated, where no one needs to bear the cost of the preventive good. Asset
holdings, production, and consumption are all slightly lower than in the steady
state with no malaria.
This result – that malaria matters only little – is at first sight surprising, given
that we have given the disease every chance to have a major impact. The cost of
lifetime protection is substantial and must be paid in full up-front (i.e., there is no
borrowing to finance prophylaxis); agents are born with no assets; and they must
also hold capital for precautionary savings. The risks of infection are low, since
others are generally healthy. Yet even so, individuals in this economy are still
willing to pay for protection as soon as they can afford it, and they afford it
rapidly.
This seems to cast doubt on the potential for the disease to cause large macro
effects in reality. Why would people in endemic areas not behave like individuals
in the model? Even if the individual costs of the disease are modest, would it not
pay for people to purchase bednets or screens or drugs to prevent or treat malaria
for themselves or their children? Our model seems to indicate that the disease
should have little macro impact where there are effective protective measures
available, even if they are somewhat costly.
Experiment 3:
Consider now the effects of varying the cost of protection from malaria. How
large does the cost need to be before it is viewed as effectively unaffordable or
undesirable (as in Experiment 1)? Figure 2 graphs a discrete approximation of the
relationship between protection costs and the steady-state levels of output,
consumption, assets, and the proportion of people sick and protected. As the
protection cost rises, steady-state output falls in a weakly monotonic fashion.
A crude rule of thumb is that, for values of q less than one year’s average
income, essentially everyone in the model economy purchases the preventive
good and buys protection from the disease. For costs much higher than one year’s
average income, some people opt not to purchase protection. Typically, these are
individuals who have accumulated little capital and have had bad draws of the
persistent idiosyncratic shock. For costs greater than twice the steady-state
average income, essentially no one buys protection, including the “lucky rich.”
As a result, the economy faces the full force of the disease.
Thus, for malaria to have a big impact on income per capita, it must be true
either that (a) there is not a truly effective bundle of preventive goods or actions;
or (b) people are not aware of the effectiveness of the preventive goods; or (c) the
cost of the preventive goods or actions is very high – in excess of one year’s
annual income. The model suggests strongly that a moderate charge for bednets or
spraying or drugs, if these prevention and control measures were truly effective,
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would not deter people from purchasing these goods, simply for their private
benefits.
Panel (d) of Figure 2 shows the proportions of people sick and protected as a
function of the cost of q. Clearly the proportion sick rises as q increases, while the
proportion buying protection falls (consistent with the law of demand).
Are the results of Experiment 3 driven by specific parameter values? Figures 3
and 4 demonstrate the robustness of the basic results to changes in the impact of
the disease on the full range of parameters. It is striking that the qualitative results
survive reasonably large changes in the parameter values.
Experiment 4:
Experiments 2 and 3 seem to raise a puzzle. Why is it that in actual malarial
economies, relatively few people seem to use the protection measures that are
available? In most countries, bednet use is very low, and the private demand for
indoor residual spraying is even lower. In the model economy, by contrast, people
seem willing to pay for preventive measures even when they are expensive. Why
do individuals in malarial countries not take greater advantage of the available
preventive goods? One hypothesis might be lack of information; another might be
limited availability of the necessary items. But in most malarial countries, the
basic preventive goods are widely available, and they are well understood, since
government and non-governmental programs have been promoting their use for
many years and, in some cases, even giving them away.
In this experiment, we ask whether a possible explanation might arise from
limited efficacy. Hitherto, we have assumed that an individual who buys the
preventive bundle is fully protected for life. In reality, however, the available
protective goods are far less than one hundred percent effective.
Our model predicts that if the bundle of preventive goods is less than fully
efficacious, there will be a dramatic reduction in the fraction of people purchasing
protection. The intuition behind this result is simple enough; the only thing worse
for people in the model than getting sick would be to get sick after buying the
preventive good.
Figure 5 shows the rapid drop-off in the fraction of people purchasing
protection, for the cases where the protective bundle is less than fully effective. It
is striking that even a relatively modest loss of efficacy would have large impacts
on the economy. For example, at the benchmark level of prevention cost – of q
equal to approximately one-fourth of annual income – a reduction from 100
percent efficacy to 99 percent efficacy would have a very small but measurable
impact on the fraction of the population purchasing protection. At a higher
prevention cost of q equal to two years’ income, however, a reduction from 100
percent efficacy to 99 percent efficacy would induce a decline of ten percentage
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points in the fraction of people purchasing prevention. A decline to 95 percent
efficacy would reduce by half the number of people purchasing protection.
The effects on steady-state output would also be large. Figure 6 shows how
steady-state output would be affected by decreases in the efficacy of the
preventive good, holding all else constant. Again, at the benchmark prevention
cost of one-fourth of annual income, a decline from perfect efficacy to 99 percent
efficacy would reduce steady-state output by about seven percent. With q equal to
two years’ income, a decline from perfect efficacy to 99 percent efficacy would
lead to approximately a ten percent drop in steady-state output. With q = 2, a
decline to 95 percent efficacy would reduce steady-state output by about onethird.
Although the model is clearly stylized, the analysis of efficacy has potentially
important implications for policy. Where malaria prevention and control methods
are less than fully effective – and the measures available today most probably
have lower rates of effectiveness than the numbers analyzed here – it is to be
expected that take-up rates will be very low, given any significant costs. Low
take-up rates would be rational in this case, rather than reflecting ignorance or
lack of information.

6.

Conclusions

These results point to several notable conclusions. First, it is entirely possible
for an economy to arrive at a “malaria trap,” in which sickness begets poverty and
poverty makes disease prevention unaffordable. In the model economy, we can
quantify the magnitude of this “malaria trap.” It can reduce income per capita by
about half. By point of comparison, Gallup and Sachs (2000) note that the 44
countries with intensive malaria burdens in 1995 had per capita income of $1,526,
compared with $8,268 for the 106 countries without intensive malaria burden.
Our model suggests that the disease alone could account for just under half of this
income gap.
Economies in this situation could certainly benefit from being helped across
the disease threshold into an alternate steady state in which the disease is
essentially eradicated. The problem, of course, is that this intervention may be
very expensive, in the model economy as well as in the real world. A related
problem is that efficacious preventive measures may not exist. However, in the
model economy, where prevention is available, people will be willing to pay
considerable amounts for it – assuming efficacy.
Where the costs of the disease are not large, however, a striking result of the
model is that the private incentives are powerful enough that people will bear the
cost of protection. For costs that are modest – as appears to be true in reality for
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bednets and spraying, and as may eventually be true for a vaccine – people in the
model economy purchase protection. Costs must be large, relative to average
annual income, before they affect the take-up of the preventive good. However, if
he preventive good is not fully effective, there will be powerful impacts on takeup and on real outcomes.
Another point worth noting here is that all of our analysis looks at private
responses to malaria. But we know that decentralized outcomes in this economy
are not optimal, because there are important infection externalities operating.
Individuals in our model economy do not weigh in their decisions the potential
impact of their actions on others. In particular, they are likely to under-invest in
prevention relative to the social planner’s optimum. This suggests that there may
be a significant role for the public sector to undertake campaigns of prevention
and/or treatment.
A few final points deserve reflection. First, utility comparisons across steady
states in this model are complicated. Many more people are born and die in the
steady states where people are poor and sick, and it is difficult to know what
utility weight to assign to births and deaths. A simple comparison of income
levels for the living is inadequate.
In the same vein, it is important to note that the ultimate justification for
investments in malaria control and treatment is the welfare cost, rather than the
reduction in steady-state income per capita. Even if we found that the impacts on
steady-state income were small, there are many other reasons why we should care
about malaria and the enormous and tragic harm that it does. For hundreds of
thousands of families, malaria is killing their infants and children. In many other
families, the disease interferes with daily life, including schooling. Whether or not
these effects are important for national income, they matter deeply to the
individuals and communities that are affected. We do not need to justify malaria
control programs on the grounds that they will contribute to GDP or to GDP
growth. This must be one ingredient of our thinking, but the moral imperative
alone is surely sufficient to justify some efforts for prevention, control and
treatment.
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Table 1: Experiment 1 Results (Multiple steady states with prohibitively
expensive protection).
q = 1000
Low
High
z = 0.7
Endogenously determined fertility rate

0.069

0.0150

Proportion sick

0.9007

0.0000

Proportion protected from disease

0.0000

0.0000

Average assets

2.9596

12.0797

Average output

1.3913

2.4521

Average consumption

1.1565

2.2668

Table 2: Experiment 2 Results (Multiple steady states with feasible but costly
disease protection).
High
q = 0.6
Low
z = 0.7
Endogenously determined fertility rate

0.015

0.0150

Proportion sick

0.0006

0.0000

Proportion protected from disease

0.9770

0.0000

Average assets

12.0631

12.0797

Average output

2.4488

2.4521

Average consumption

2.2553

2.2668

25.

Figure 1. Distributions of individual asset holdings in benchmark economy,
steady states with and without malaria.
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Figure 2: Benchmark economy, showing response of key variables
to changes in the cost of protection from disease, in "sick" and "healthy"
steady states.
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Figure 3: Robustness checks -- sensitivity of the model to changes in parameter values.
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Figure 3: Robustness checks -- sensitivity of the model to changes in key parameter
values.
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Figure 5: Proportion of people who have purchased protection in steady-state,
for economies differing in the degree of efficacy of the preventive good.
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Figure 6: Output per person relative to benchmark economy,
for economies differing in the degree of efficacy of the preventive good.
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